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We investigate limitations imposed by sequential attacks on the performance of differential-phase-
shift quantum key distribution protocols that use pulsed coherent light. In particular, we analyze two
sequential attacks based on unambiguous state discrimination and minimum error discrimination,
respectively, of the signal states emitted by the source. Sequential attacks represent a special type
of intercept-resend attacks and, therefore, they do not allow the distribution of a secret key.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] is a technique
that exploits quantum effects to establish a secure se-
cret key between two parties (usually called Alice and
Bob). This secret key is the essential ingredient of the
one-time-pad or Vernam cipher [2], the only known en-
cryption method that can provide information-theoretic
secure communications.
The first complete scheme for QKD is that introduced
by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 (BB84 for short) [3].
A full proof of the security for the whole protocol has
been given in Ref. [4]. After the first demonstration of
the feasibility of this scheme [5], several long-distance im-
plementations have been realized in the last years (see,
for instance, Ref. [6] and references therein). However,
these practical approaches differ in many important as-
pects from the original theoretical proposal, since that
demands technologies that are beyond our present ex-
perimental capability. Specially, the signals emitted by
the source, instead of being single-photons, are usually
weak coherent pulses (WCP) with typical average pho-
ton numbers of 0.1 or higher. Moreover, the detectors
employed by the receiver have a low detection efficiency
and are noisy due to dark counts. These facts, together
with the loss and the noise introduced by the quantum
channel, jeopardize the security of the protocol, and leads
to limitations of rate and distance that can be covered
by these techniques [7, 8].
The main security threat of QKD based on WCP arises
from the fact that some pulses contain more than one
photon prepared in the same polarization state. Now,
an eavesdropper (Eve) can perform, for instance, the
so-called Photon Number Splitting (PNS) attack on the
multi-photon pulses [7]. This attack provides Eve with
full information about the part of the key generated from
the multi-photon signals, without causing any distur-
bance in the signal polarization. As a result, it turns out
that the BB84 protocol with WCP can give a key gener-
ation rate of order O(η2), where η denotes the transmis-
sion efficiency of only the quantum channel [9].
To obtain higher secure key rates over longer distances,
different QKD schemes robust against the PNS attack
have been proposed in recent years. One of these schemes
is the so-called decoy-states [10, 11], where Alice ran-
domly varies the mean photon number of the signal states
sent to Bob by using different intensity settings. This
technique delivers a key generation rate of order O(η)
[10, 11]. Other possibility is based on the transmission
of two non-orthogonal coherent states together with a
strong reference pulse [12]. This scheme has been ana-
lyzed in Ref. [13], where it was confirmed that also in
this scenario the secure key rate is of order O(η). Fi-
nally, another possible approach is the use of differential-
phase-shift (DPS) QKD protocols [14–17]. In this kind
of schemes, Alice sends to Bob a train of WCP whose
phases are randomly modulated by 0 or pi. On the re-
ceiving side, Bob measures out each incoming signal by
means of an interferometer whose path-length difference
is set equal to the time difference between two pulses. In
this case, however, a secure key rate of order O(η) has
only been proven so far against a particular type of in-
dividual attacks where Eve acts on photons individually,
rather than signals [15]. Whether DPS QKD is secure
against the most general attack remains an important
open question.
In this paper, we investigate limitations imposed by
sequential attacks on the performance of DPS QKD pro-
tocols. In this kind of attacks, Eve measures out every
coherent state emitted by Alice and prepares new sig-
nal states, depending on the results obtained, that are
given to Bob. Whenever Eve obtains a predetermined
number of consecutive successful measurement outcomes,
then she prepares a train of WCP that is forwarded to
Bob. Otherwise, Eve sends vacuum signals to Bob to
avoid errors. Sequential attacks constitute a special type
2of intercept-resend attacks [18–20] and, therefore, they do
not allow the distribution of a secret key [21]. Here we
shall consider a conservative definition of security, i.e.,
we assume that Eve can control some flaws in Alice’s
and Bob’s devices (e.g., the detection efficiency and the
dark count probability of the detectors), together with
the losses in the channel, and she exploits them to ob-
tain maximal information about the shared key.
We analyze two possible sequential attacks. In the
first one, Eve realizes unambiguous state discrimination
(USD) of Alice’s signal states [18, 22, 23]. When Eve
identifies unambiguously a signal state sent by Alice, then
she considers this result as successful. Otherwise, she
considers it a failure. In the second attack, Eve per-
forms first a filtering operation on each signal emitted by
Alice and, afterwards, she measures out each successful
filtered state following the approach of minimum error
discrimination (MED) [24, 25], i.e., she guesses the iden-
tity of the filtered state with the minimum probability
of making an error. (See also Ref. [20].) As a result, we
obtain upper bounds on the maximal distance achievable
by DPS QKD schemes as a function of the error rate in
the sifted key, the double click rate at Bob’s side, and
the mean photon-number of the signals sent by Alice.
Instead of using an USD measurement on each signal
state sent by Alice, like in the first sequential attack that
we consider, Eve could as well employ the same detection
device like Bob. This sequential attack was very briefly
introduced in Ref. [15]. A successful result is now asso-
ciated with obtaining a click in Eve’s apparatus, while a
failure corresponds to the absence of a click. However,
since Alice’s signal states are typically coherent pulses
with small average photon number, the probability of
obtaining a successful result in this scenario is always
smaller than the one of a sequential USD attack. There-
fore, a sequential USD attack can provide tighter upper
bounds on the performance of DPS QKD protocols than
those derived from an eavesdropping strategy where Eve
uses the same measurement apparatus like Bob.
A different QKD scheme, but also related to DPS QKD
protocols, has been proposed recently in Ref. [27]. (See
also Ref. [28].) However, since the abstract signal struc-
ture of this protocol is different from the one of DPS
QKD schemes, the analysis contained in this paper does
not apply to that scenario. Sequential attacks against
the QKD protocol introduced in Ref. [27] have been in-
vestigated in Ref. [29] following a similar approach like
in this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we de-
scribe in more detail DPS QKD protocols. Then, in
Sec. III, we present sequential attacks against DPS QKD
schemes. Sec. IV includes the analysis for a sequen-
tial USD attack. Here we obtain an upper bound on
the maximal distance achievable by DPS QKD schemes
as a function of the error rate, the double click rate at
Bob’s side, and the mean photon-number of Alice’s signal
states. Similar results are derived in Sec. V, now for the
case of sequential attacks based on MED of the signals
FIG. 1: Basic setup of a DPS QKD scheme. PM denotes a
phase modulator, BS, a 50 : 50 beam-splitter, M, a mirror,
D0 and D1 are two photon detectors, and ∆t represents the
time difference between two consecutive pulses.
sent by Alice. Finally, Sec. VI concludes the paper with
a summary.
II. DIFFERENTIAL-PHASE-SHIFT QKD
The setup is illustrated in Fig. 1 [14–17]. Alice pre-
pares first a train of coherent states |α〉 and, afterwards,
she modulates, at random and independently every time,
the phase of each pulse to be 0 or pi. As a result, she pro-
duces a random train of signal states |α〉 or | − α〉 that
are sent to Bob through the quantum channel. On the
receiving side, Bob uses a 50 : 50 beam-splitter to divide
the incoming pulses into two possible paths and then
he recombines then again using another 50 : 50 beam-
splitter. The time delay introduced by Bob’s interferom-
eter is set equal to the time difference ∆t between two
pulses. Whenever the relative phase between two con-
secutive pulses is 0 (±pi) only the photon detector D0
(D1) may produce a “click” (at least one photon is de-
tected). For each detected event, Bob records the exact
time where he obtained a click and the actual detector
that fired.
Once the quantum communication phase is completed,
Bob uses a classical authenticated channel to announce
the time instances where he detected at least one pho-
ton. From this information, together with the knowledge
of the phase value used to modulate each pulse, Alice
can infer which photon detector fired at Bob’s side each
given time. Then, Alice and Bob can agree, for instance,
to select a bit value “0” whenever the photon detectorD0
clicked, and a bit value “1” if the detector D1 fired. In
an ideal scenario, Alice and Bob end up with an identical
string of bits representing the sifted key. Due to the noise
introduced by the quantum channel together with possi-
ble imperfections of Alice’s and Bob’s devises, however,
the sifted key typically contains some errors. Then, Alice
and Bob perform error-correction to reconcile the data,
and privacy amplification to decouple the data from Eve.
(See, for instance, Ref. [1].)
In the next section we analyze simple sequential at-
tacks against the DPS QKD protocol introduced above
that are particularly suited for the signal states and de-
tection methods employed by Alice and Bob, together
with the attenuation introduced by the channel. Let us
3emphasize here that these attacks might not be optimal,
but, as we will show below, they already impose strong
restrictions on the performance of DPS QKD schemes
with weak coherent pulses.
III. SEQUENTIAL ATTACKS AGAINST
DIFFERENTIAL-PHASE-SHIFT QKD
A sequential attack can be seen as a special type of
intercept-resend attack. First, Eve measures every co-
herent state emitted by Alice with a detection apparatus
located very close to the sender. Afterwards, she trans-
mits each measurement result through a lossless classical
channel to a source close to Bob. Whenever Eve obtains
a predetermined number of consecutive successful mea-
surement outcomes, this source prepares a train of new
signal states that is forwarded to Bob. Otherwise, Eve
sends vacuum signals to Bob to avoid errors. Whether
a measurement is considered to be successful or not and
which type of non-vacuum states Eve sends to Bob de-
pends on Eve’s particular eavesdropping strategy and on
her measurement device. Sequential attacks transform
the original quantum channel between Alice and Bob
into an entanglement breaking channel [26] and, there-
fore, they do not allow the distribution of a secret key
[21].
We begin by introducing Eve’s measurement appara-
tus. As mentioned previously, we shall consider two pos-
sible alternatives. Each alternative provides a different
sequential attack. In the first one, Eve realizes USD
[22, 23] of Alice’s signal states. Whenever Eve identi-
fies unambiguously a signal state sent by Alice, i.e., she
determines without error whether it is |α〉 or | − α〉, she
considers this result as successful. If the measurement
outcome corresponds to an inconclusive result then she
considers it a failure. The second eavesdropping strategy
can be decomposed into two steps: first, Eve performs
a filtering operation on each signal state sent by Alice
with the intention to make them, with some finite prob-
ability, more “distinguishable”. A failure refers now to
those signal states for which the filtering operation does
not succeed. Afterwards, Eve measures out each success-
ful filtered state following the approach of MED [24, 25].
Her goal is to guess the identity of the filtered states with
the minimum probability of making an error. Notice that
the first eavesdropping strategy can be considered as a
special case of the second eavesdropping strategy where
the probability that Eve makes an error in distinguishing
a state |α〉 and | − α〉 is exactly zero. We shall denote as
psucc the probability that Eve obtains a successful result
whatever the measurement device she employs.
In order to evaluate her measurement outcomes, we
shall consider that Eve divides her data into different
blocks of length M , where each block contains M con-
secutive measurement results. Moreover, we assume that
Eve analyzes each block of data independently, i.e., with-
out considering the data included in other blocks. As we
FIG. 2: Illustration of a sequential attack. In this example
the length of each block is M = 5, the minimum number
of consecutive successful results within a block is given by
Mmin = 3, and we assume that Eve obtains m = 4 consecu-
tive successful results within a block. A successful outcome is
represented with a vertical solid line in the classical channel,
while a failure result is denoted with a vertical dashed line.
will show later on, this eavesdropping strategy will nec-
essarily create some error rate that decreases when incre-
menting the block length M. In this scenario, we define
the integer parameter Mmin, with ⌊M/2+ 1⌋ ≤Mmin <
M , as the minimum number of consecutive successful re-
sults within a block that Eve needs to obtain in order to
send Bob a new train of coherent states |βeiθj 〉. This def-
inition of Mmin arises from the particular eavesdropping
strategies that we consider here, and the role of this pa-
rameterMmin will become clear later on. More precisely,
if m denotes the total number of consecutive successful
outcomes obtained by Eve within a block, then, when-
ever m is bigger thanMmin, Eve prepares m consecutive
coherent states |βeiθ1〉, |βeiθ2〉, . . . , |βeiθm〉, together with
M−m vacuum states for those unsuccessful results within
the block and sends these signals to Bob. On the other
hand, if m < Mmin Eve sends to Bob M vacuum states.
The case m = Mmin deserves a special attention. We
shall consider that in this case Eve employs a probabilis-
tic strategy that combines the two previous ones. In par-
ticular, we assume that Eve sends to Bob Mmin consec-
utive coherent states |βeiθ1〉, |βeiθ2〉, . . . , |βeiθMmin 〉 with
probability q and, with probability 1 − q, she sends to
Bob M vacuum states. That is, the parameter q allows
Eve to smoothly fit her eavesdropping strategy to the
observed data.
The angle θj of a coherent state |βeiθj 〉 prepared by Eve
depends on her particular measurement strategy. When
she utilizes an USD measurement, then θj = 0 if the state
identified by her measurement is |α〉, and θj = pi if the
state identified is | − α〉. A similar criterion can also be
applied to the case where Eve performs a filtering oper-
ation followed by a MED measurement on the successful
filtered states: If the result obtained is associated with
the signal state |α〉 then θj = 0, otherwise θj = pi. Fig. 2
shows a graphical representation of such a sequential at-
tack for the case M = 5 and Mmin = 3. In this example,
moreover, we assume that Eve obtainsm = 4 consecutive
successful results within a block.
Next, we obtain an expression for the Gain of a se-
quential attack, i.e., the probability that Bob obtains
4a click per signal state sent by Alice, as a function of
the parameters M , Mmin, q, the probability psucc of ob-
taining a successful result, and the mean photon-number
µβ = |β|2 of the coherent states sent by Eve. Afterwards,
we study the two sequential attacks introduced above in
more detail. The objective is to find an expression for
the quantum bit error rate (QBER) introduced by Eve,
and for the resulting double click rate at Bob’s side in
each of these two attacks.
A. Gain of a sequential attack
The Gain of a sequential attack is defined as Nclicks/N ,
where Nclicks represents the average total number of
clicks obtained by Bob, and N is the total number of
signal states sent by Alice. In this definition, we con-
sider that double clicks contribute to Nclicks like sin-
gle clicks. The parameter Nclicks can be expressed as
Nclicks = (N/M)N
M
clicks, with N
M
clicks denoting the aver-
age total number of clicks per block of lengthM at Bob’s
side. With this notation, the Gain of a sequential attack,
that we shall denote as G, can then be written as
G =
1
M
NMclicks. (1)
Next, we obtain an expression for NMclicks. We shall dis-
tinguish several cases, depending on the number m of co-
herent states |βeiθ1〉, |βeiθ2〉, . . . , |βeiθm〉 that Eve sends
to Bob inside a given block and the position of these co-
herent states in the block [30]. These cases are illustrated
in Fig. 3, where we also include the a priori probabilities
to be in each of these scenarios. Note, however, that the
average total number of clicks in each of these cases will
also depend on whether the last signal state of a previous
block is actually a coherent state or not. To include this
boundary effect between blocks in our analysis, we shall
always distinguish two possible alternatives for each case
included in Fig. 3, depending on the identity of the last
signal state contained in the previous block. The prob-
ability of this last signal being a coherent state, that we
shall denote as p, is calculated in Appendix A and it is
given by
p =
[
psucc + (1 − psucc)q
]
pMminsucc . (2)
Similarly, 1 − p represents the probability that the last
signal in a block is a vacuum state. Fig. 4 illustrates
these two alternatives for the case where Eve sends to
Bob a block of signals containing M coherent states.
Let us now analyze the different scenarios included in
Fig. 3 in more detail. When Eve sends to Bob a block of
signals containing M coherent states (Case A in Fig. 3)
then: If the last signal state of the previous block is a
coherent state, then it turns out that the average total
number of clicks obtained by Bob is given by Ms, where
the parameter s has the form
s = 1− exp (−µβ), (3)
FIG. 3: Possible blocks of M signals that Eve sends to Bob
together with their a priori probabilities. Case A: The block
containsM coherent states. Case B: The firstm ∈ (Mmin,M)
signals of the block are coherent states, while the last M −m
signals are vacuum states. Case C: The block contains first
M −m vacuum states followed by m ∈ (Mmin,M) coherent
states. Case D: The block hasm ∈ (Mmin,M) coherent states
and, at least, the first and the last signal of the block are
vacuum states. Case E: The firstMmin signals of the block are
coherent states, while the last M −Mmin signals are vacuum
states. Case F: The block contains first M −Mmin vacuum
states together withMmin coherent states. Case G: The block
has Mmin coherent states and, at least, the first and the last
signal of the block are vacuum states. Case H: The block
contains only vacuum states. The a priori probability of this
last scenario is given by 1−
∑
i
pi, with pi representing the a
priori probabilities of each of the previous cases.
FIG. 4: Eve sends to Bob a block of signals containing M
coherent states (Block n in the Figure). Case A: with proba-
bility p, where p is given by Eq. (2), the last signal state of the
previous block is a coherent state. Case B: with probability
1 − p the last signal state of the previous block is a vacuum
state.
5with µβ being again the mean photon-number of the co-
herent states |βeiθj 〉 sent by Eve. Otherwise, the average
total number of clicks at Bob’s side can be written as
t+ (M − 1)s, where the parameter t is given by
t = 1− exp (− µβ
2
)
. (4)
The analysis of the remaining cases is similar. If the first
m ∈ (Mmin,M) signal states of the block are coherent
states, while the last M − m signals are vacuum states
(Case B in Fig. 3) then: If the last state of the previ-
ous block is a coherent state, the average total number
of clicks obtained by Bob is given by t + ms. Other-
wise, the average total number of clicks at Bob’s side
can be written as 2t + (m − 1)s. Eve can as well send
to Bob a block containing first M − m vacuum states
followed by m ∈ (Mmin,M) coherent states (Case C in
Fig. 3). In this situation, if the last state of the previ-
ous block is a coherent state, the average total number
of clicks obtained by Bob is given by 2t+(m− 1)s. Oth-
erwise, the average total number of clicks has the form
t+ (m− 1)s. When Eve sends to Bob a block of signals
where, at least, the first and the last signals of the block
are vacuum states (Case D in Fig. 3) then: If the last
state of the previous block is a coherent state, the aver-
age total number of clicks obtained by Bob is given by
3t + (m − 1)s. Otherwise, the average total number of
clicks has the form 2t + (m − 1)s. The cases E, F, and
G, in Fig. 3 are completely analogous to the the cases
B, C, and D, respectively. The only difference arises in
the a priori probabilities to be in each of these scenarios.
Now, these a priori probabilities need to be multiplied by
the factor q introduced in Sec. III, i.e., by the probability
that Eve actually decides to sendMmin coherent states in
the block. Finally, when the block contains only vacuum
states (Case H in Fig. 3) then: If the last state of the
previous block is a coherent state the average total num-
ber of clicks obtained by Bob is given by t. Otherwise,
the average total number of clicks is zero.
After adding all these terms, together with their a pri-
ori probabilities, we obtain that the average total number
of clicks per block of length M at Bob’s side in a sequen-
tial attack can be expressed as
NMclicks = pt+ p
M
succuM +
∑
Mmin≤m<M
qδmMmin (1 − psucc)pmsucc
[
vm + (M −m− 1)(1− psucc)wm
]
, (5)
where δmMmin is equal to one if m = Mmin and it is
zero otherwise, and the parameters uM , vm, and wm, are
given by
uM = (1− 2p)t+ (M − 1 + p)s,
vm = (3− 2p)t+ (2m+ p− 2)s,
wm = 2t+ (m− 1)s. (6)
IV. SEQUENTIAL UNAMBIGUOUS STATE
DISCRIMINATION ATTACK
As already mentioned in the previous section, in this
attack Eve performs unambiguous state discrimination
(USD) [22, 23] of Alice’s signal states. Whenever Eve
identifies without error a signal state sent by Alice then
she considers this result as successful. If the identification
process does not succeed, then she considers it a failure.
The probability of obtaining a successful result per signal
state sent by Alice has the form [22]
psucc = 1− |〈α| − α〉| = 1− exp (−2µα), (7)
where µα is the mean photon-number of the signal states
sent by Alice, i.e., µα = |α|2.
Next, we obtain an expression for the quantum bit er-
ror rate (QBER) introduced by Eve with this attack, and
also for the resulting double click rate at Bob’s side.
A. Quantum bit error rate
The QBER is defined asNerrors/Nclicks, where Nerrors
represents the average total number of errors obtained
by Bob, and Nclicks is again the average total number
of clicks at Bob’s side. The parameter Nerrors can be
expressed as Nerrors = (N/M)N
M
errors, with N
M
errors de-
noting the average total number of errors per block of
lengthM . With this notation, the QBER of a sequential
attack, that we shall denote as Q, can then be expressed
as
Q =
1
M
NMerrors
G
. (8)
Next, we obtain an expression for NMerrors. We
shall distinguish the same cases as in the previous sec-
tion, depending on the number m of coherent states
|βeiθ1〉, |βeiθ2〉, . . . , |βeiθm〉 inside a block and their po-
sition in the block.
Whenever the previous signal of a coherent state in-
side the block is a coherent state, then no errors oc-
cur since both signals have the proper relative phase
between them. On the contrary, if the previous signal
of a coherent state is a vacuum state or if the previ-
ous signal of a vacuum state is a coherent state then
it turns out that an error can happen with probability
exp (−µβ/4)[1 − exp (−µβ/4)] + [1 − exp (−µβ/4)]2/
6t/2, where the parameter t is given by Eq. (4). The error
term [1 − exp (−µβ/4)]2/2 that appears in the previous
expression arises from double clicks at Bob’s side. Here,
we consider that double click events are not discarded by
Bob, but they contribute to the sifted key. Every time
Bob obtains a double click, he just decides randomly the
bit value [31].
Let us begin with Case A in Fig. 3. According to the
previous paragraph, if the last signal state of the previous
block is a coherent state, then the average total number of
errors obtained by Bob is zero. Otherwise, it is given by
t/2. When the first m ∈ (Mmin,M) signal states of the
block are coherent states (Case B in Fig. 3) and the last
state of the previous block is also a coherent state, then
the average total number of errors obtained by Bob is
given by t/2. Otherwise, the average total number of er-
rors is t. Similarly, if Eve sends to Bob a block containing
first M −m vacuum states followed by m ∈ (Mmin,M)
coherent states (Case C in Fig. 3) and the last signal of
the previous block is a coherent state, then the average
total number of errors is given by t. Otherwise, the av-
erage total number of errors has the form t/2. Eve can
also send a block of signals where, at least, the first and
the last signals of the block are vacuum states (Case D
in Fig. 3). Then, if the last state of the previous block is
a coherent state, the average total number of errors ob-
tained by Bob is given by 3t/2. Otherwise, the average
total number of errors is t. Like in the previous section,
the results for the cases E, F, and G, in Fig. 3 can be ob-
tained directly from the cases B, C, and D, respectively.
One only needs to multiply the a priori probabilities to
be in each of these last three scenarios by the factor q.
Finally, if the block contains only vacuum states (Case
H in Fig. 3) and the last state of the previous block is a
coherent state, then the average total number of errors
is given by t/2. Otherwise, the average total number of
errors is zero.
After adding all the terms together, and taking into
account the a priori probabilities of each case, we ob-
tain that the average total number of errors per block of
length M in a sequential USD attack has the following
form
NMerrors = tS, (9)
where the parameter S is given by
S =
p
2
+ pMsucc
(
1
2
− p
)
+
∑
Mmin≤m<M
qδmMmin (1 − psucc)pmsucc
[(
3
2
− p
)
+ (M −m− 1)(1− psucc)
]
. (10)
B. Double click rate
The double click rate at Bob’s side, that we shall
denote as Dc, is typically defined as Dc = NDc/N ,
where NDc refers to the average total number of dou-
ble clicks obtained by Bob, and N is again the total
number of signal states sent by Alice. NDc is given by
NDc = (N/M)N
M
Dc
, with NMDc denoting the average total
number of double clicks per block sent by Eve at Bob’s
side. The Dc can be written as
Dc =
1
M
NMDc . (11)
In order to obtain an expression for NMDc , we can again
distinguish the same different cases included in Fig. 3.
Double clicks can only occur when the previous signal
of a coherent state is a vacuum state or when the pre-
vious signal of a vacuum state is a coherent state. The
probability to obtain a double click in each of these two
scenarios, that we shall denote as d, is given by
d = [1− exp (−µβ
4
)]2. (12)
Otherwise, the probability to have a double click is al-
ways zero. The analysis is then completely equivalent to
the one included in Sec. IVA, one only needs to substi-
tute the parameter t/2 by d. We obtain, therefore, that
the average total number of double clicks per block sent
by Eve in a sequential USD attack can be written as
NMDc = 2dS, (13)
with S given by Eq. (10).
C. Evaluation
We have seen above that a sequential USD attack can
be parameterized by the block size M , the minimum
number Mmin of consecutive successful results within a
block that Eve needs to obtain in order to send Bob a
new train of coherent states, the mean photon-number
µβ of these coherent states sent by Eve, and the value of
the probability q, i.e., the probability that Eve actually
decides to send Mmin coherent states in a block instead
of only vacuum states.
Fig. 5 shows a graphical representation of the Gain
versus the QBER in this attack for different values of the
maximum tolerable double click rate at Bob’s side. In
this example we consider that the mean photon number
of Alice’s signal states is given by µα = 0.16. Moreover,
we fix the value of Mmin as Mmin = ⌊M/2 + 1⌋ and,
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FIG. 5: Gain versus QBER in a sequential USD attack for
different values of the maximum tolerable double click rate
at Bob’s side: Dc < 10
−8 (solid), Dc < 10
−10 (dashed), and
Dc < 10
−12 (dotted). The mean photon number of Alice’s sig-
nal states is µα = 0.16. The triangle represents experimental
data from Ref. [16].
for each given values of the parameters M , q ∈ [0, 1],
and the maximum tolerable double click rate obtained
by Bob, we perform a numerical optimization to find the
optimal mean photon number µβ for each case, i.e., the
one that provides a lower QBER for a given value of
the Gain. Fig. 5 also includes experimental data from
Ref. [16]. According to these results we find that, unless
Alice and Bob reject a double click rate as low as 10−8,
the DPS QKD experiment reported in Ref. [16] would be
insecure against a sequential USD attack. More precisely,
our analysis suggest that in this kind of QKD protocols is
not enough for Alice and Bob to include the effect of the
double clicks obtained by Bob in the QBER [31], but it
might be very useful for the legitimate users to monitor
also the double click rate to guarantee security against a
sequential attack. The authors of Ref. [16] already no-
ticed in Ref. [17] that their experiment is not covered by
the existing initial security analysis provided in Ref. [15].
Our result is strong as it also shows that when the double
click rate at Bob’s side is above 10−8 no improved classi-
cal communication protocol or improved security analysis
might allow the data of Ref. [16] to be turned into secret
key.
Fig. 6 shows a graphical representation for the case
where Alice and Bob do not monitor separately the
double click rate and Eve can optimize the mean pho-
ton number µβ for each given values of M , Mmin =
⌊M/2+ 1⌋, and the parameter q, without any restriction
on the maximum tolerable double click rate at Bob’s side.
A similar representation is plotted in Fig. 7, but now
for the case µα = 0.2 and for different values of the max-
imum double click rate at Bob’s side. In this figure we
also include data from a recent experiment reported in
Ref. [17], where the QBER was reduced to a value of only
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FIG. 6: Gain versus QBER in a sequential USD attack. The
solid line corresponds to a maximum tolerable double click
rate at Bob’s side of Dc < 10
−8. The dashed line represents
the case where Alice and Bob do not monitor separately the
double click rate obtained by Bob. The mean photon number
of Alice’s signal states is µα = 0.16. The triangle represents
experimental data from Ref. [16].
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FIG. 7: Gain versus QBER in a sequential USD attack for
different values of the maximum tolerable double click rate at
Bob’s side: Dc < 10
−10 (solid), Dc < 10
−12 (dashed), and
Dc < 10
−14 (dotted). The mean photon number of Alice’s
signal states is µα = 0.2. The triangle represents experimental
data from Ref. [17].
3.4%. The scenario where Alice and Bob do not monitor
separately the double click rate obtained by Bob is illus-
trated in Fig. 8. In both cases, our results are consistent
with the possibility to create secret keys.
According to the figures presented in this section,
whenever Eve tries to increase the Gain of this attack
by reducing, for instance, the size M of her blocks,
she also increases the resulting QBER obtained by Bob.
The maximum value of the Gain that Eve can achieve,
however, is actually limited by the probability psucc =
1 − exp (−2µα) of obtaining a successful result when
distinguishing unambiguously the states | ± α〉. Since,
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FIG. 8: Gain versus QBER in a sequential USD attack. The
solid line corresponds to a maximum tolerable double click
rate at Bob’s side of Dc < 10
−10. The dashed line represents
the case where Alice and Bob do not monitor separately the
double click rate obtained by Bob. The mean photon number
of Alice’s signal states is µα = 0.2. The triangle represents
experimental data from Ref. [17].
by definition, ⌊M/2 + 1⌋ ≤ Mmin < M , the minimum
value of a valid block size M is given by M = 3. This
means, in particular, that in order to maximize the Gain
of a sequential USD attack the best choice for Eve is
to select M = 3 and Mmin = 2. Moreover, we can as-
sume that Eve always sends to BobMmin coherent states
|βeiθ1〉, |βeiθ2〉, . . . , |βeiθMmin 〉 when she obtains Mmin
successful results (i.e., q = 1), and that these coherent
states have a really high mean photon number such as
she increases Bob’s probability of obtaining a click (i.e.,
µβ ≫ 1 and, therefore, s ≈ 1, t ≈ 1, and d ≈ 1). Using
these values in Eq. (1) and Eq. (5) we obtain that the
maximum value of the Gain in this attack is given by
Gmax ≈ 1
3
(6− 2psucc − p2succ)p2succ. (14)
In this case the QBER, and the double click rate at Bob’s
side are, respectively, given byQ ≈ (2−psucc−p2succ)/(6−
2psucc − p2succ) and Dc ≈ 2(2− psucc − p2succ)p2succ/3.
On the contrary, the minimum value of the Gain occurs
when Eve treats the total number of signals N sent by
Alice as a single block, i.e., M = N , and she further im-
poses Mmin =M − 1, q = 0, and s ≈ 1. In this case, the
minimum Gain is given by pNsucc, and the QBER and dou-
ble click rate at Bob’s side are both zero. This scenario
corresponds to the situation where Eve only sends N co-
herent states |βeiθ1〉, |βeiθ2〉, . . . , |βeiθN 〉 to Bob when she
succeeds discriminating without error all the signal states
sent by Alice.
Finally, let us mention that, instead of using an USD
measurement on each signal state sent by Alice, Eve
could as well employ the same detection device like Bob.
This sequential attack was very briefly introduced in
Ref. [15]. In this case, a successful result is associated
with obtaining a click in Eve’s apparatus, while a failure
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FIG. 9: Gain versus QBER for a sequential USD attack (solid)
and for a sequential attack where Eve employs the same de-
tection device like Bob (dashed). The maximum tolerable
double click rate at Bob’s side is Dc < 10
−8 and the mean
photon number of Alice’s signal states is µα = 0.16. The
triangle represents experimental data from Ref. [16].
corresponds to the absence of a click. The train of coher-
ent states |βeiθ1〉, |βeiθ2〉, . . . , |βeiθm〉 that Eve sends to
Bob is now selected such as the relative phase between
consecutive signals agree with Eve’s measurement results.
If we assume that Eve does not analyze each block of
data independently, but she also includes a proper rela-
tive phase between blocks when the last signal of a pre-
vious block and the first signal of the following one are
coherent states, then the results included in this section
also apply to that case. Otherwise, the QBER in such
kind of attack will be always higher than in a sequential
USD attack. However, since Alice’s signal states are typ-
ically coherent pulses with small average photon number
(i.e., |α|2 ≪ 1), Eve observes click events only occasion-
ally. In particular, when she uses the same detection
apparatus like Bob then the probability of obtaining a
successful result will be always smaller than the one of
a sequential USD attack. More precisely, this success
probability has now the form psucc = 1− exp (−µα), and
is smaller than the success probability given by Eq. (7).
Fig. 9 shows a graphical representation of the Gain versus
the QBER for a sequential USD attack together with a
sequential attack where Eve employs the same detection
apparatus like Bob. In this example the maximum toler-
able double click rate at Bob’s side is given by Dc < 10
−8
and the mean photon number of Alice’s signal states is
µα = 0.16. Moreover, we fix again the value of Mmin
as Mmin = ⌊M/2 + 1⌋ and, for each given values of the
parameters M and q ∈ [0, 1], we perform a numerical
optimization to find the optimal µβ for each case like be-
fore. From the results included in Fig. 9 we see that a
sequential USD attack can provide tighter upper bounds
on the performance of DPS QKD schemes than a sequen-
tial attack with Eve employing the same detection device
like Bob.
9V. SEQUENTIAL MINIMUM ERROR
DISCRIMINATION ATTACK
In this eavesdropping strategy Eve performs first a fil-
tering operation on each signal state sent by Alice with
the intention to make them, with some finite probability,
more “distinguishable”. Afterwards, Eve measures out
each successful filtered state with a measurement device
that gives her the minimum value of the error probability
when identifying the states [24, 25]. Her goal is to try to
determine whether the filtered states originate from |α〉
or from | − α〉.
The coherent states sent by Alice can be expressed in
some orthogonal basis {|0〉, |1〉} as follows
| ± α〉 = a|0〉 ± b|1〉, (15)
where we assume, without of generality, that the coeffi-
cients a and b are given by
a =
√
1
2
[
1 + exp (−2µα)
]
(16)
b =
√
1
2
[
1− exp (−2µα)
]
, (17)
(18)
that is, they satisfy, a ∈ R, b ∈ R, a2 + b2 = 1, and a > b
when µα 6= 0.
We shall consider that Eve uses a filtering operation
defined by the following two Kraus operators [32]:
Asucc(λ) = λ|0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|, (19)
Afail(λ) =
√
1− λ2|0〉〈0|, (20)
where the coefficient λ satisfies λ ∈ [b/a, 1]. This param-
eter allows Eve to increase the probability of obtaining a
successful result and, therefore, she can increase the Gain
of her attack. On the other hand, Eve can introduce also
more errors at Bob’s side.
Suppose that the filtering operation receives as in-
put the state | ± α〉. The probability of getting a suc-
cessful result can be calculated as psucc ≡ pλsucc =
Tr[| ± α〉〈±α| A†succ(λ)Asucc(λ)]. This quantity is given
by
pλsucc = a
2λ2 + b2. (21)
If the filtering operation succeeded, the resulting normal-
ized filtered state, that we shall denote as | ± αsucc〉, can
be calculated as | ± αsucc〉 = (1/
√
pλsucc) Asucc(λ)| ± α〉.
We obtain
| ± αsucc〉 = 1√
pλsucc
(λa|0〉 ± b|1〉). (22)
As already mentioned previously, in order to decide
which signal state was used by Alice, we consider that
Eve follows the approach of MED. That is, she em-
ploys a measurement strategy that guesses the iden-
tity of the signals | ± αsucc〉 with the minimum prob-
ability of making an error. For the case of two pure
states with equal a priori probabilities, like it is the
case that we have here, the optimal value of the error
probability, that we shall denote as perr, is given by
perr = [1−
√
1− |〈−αsucc|αsucc〉|2]/2 [24]. From Eq. (22)
we obtain, therefore,
perr =
1
2
(aλ− b)2
a2λ2 + b2
. (23)
The von Neumann measurement which can be used to
attain this error probability is given by the optimum de-
tector states |±〉 = 1/√2(|0〉 ± |1〉).
Note that the sequential USD attack introduced in
Sec. IV can then be seen as a special case of this sequen-
tial MED attack. When λ = b/a, the success probability
in a sequential MED attack is given by pλsucc = 2b
2 =
1− exp (−2µα), which coincides with the success proba-
bility given by Eq. (7). Moreover, in this case the error
probability perr is zero.
Next, we obtain an expression for the QBER intro-
duced by Eve with this attack, and also for the resulting
double click rate at Bob’s side.
A. Quantum bit error rate
From Eq. (8) we learn that in order to obtain an ex-
pression for the QBER in a sequential attack we only
need to find the average total number of errors NMerrors
per block of length M .
Now, however, the analysis is slightly different from
that considered in Sec. IVA since two consecutive coher-
ent states in a block can also produce errors. This arises
from the fact that sometimes Eve does not identify cor-
rectly the signal states | ± α〉 sent by Alice. In particular,
whenever the previous signal of a coherent state inside a
block is also a coherent state, then an error can occur
with probability [perr(1− perr) + perr(1− perr)]s, where
perr is given by Eq. (23) and s is given by Eq. (3). This is
the probability that only one of the two coherent states
is wrongly identify by Eve and Bob detects the error by
means of a click in his apparatus. We shall denote this
error probability as p˜err. Using Eq. (23), we can write
p˜err as
p˜err =
1
2
(
a2λ2 − b2
a2λ2 + b2
)2
s. (24)
If the previous signal of a coherent state is a vacuum
state or if the previous signal of a vacuum state is a co-
herent state then the error probability is the same as in
Sec. IVA, i.e., it has the form t/2 with t given by Eq. (4).
We can now address the different cases contained in
Fig. 3 like in the previous sections and obtain an expres-
sion for NMerrors as a function of these two error proba-
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bilities. The analysis is included in Appendix B. We find that NMerrors can be written as
NMerrors =
pt
2
+ pMsuccu˜M +
∑
Mmin≤m<M
qδmMmin (1− psucc)pmsucc
[
v˜m + (M −m− 1)(1− psucc)w˜m
]
, (25)
where the parameters u˜M , v˜m, and w˜m, are given by
u˜M =
(1− 2p)t
2
+ (M − 1 + p)p˜err,
v˜m =
(3− 2p)t
2
+ (2m+ p− 2)p˜err,
w˜m = t+ (m− 1)p˜err, (26)
and with p given by Eq. (2).
B. Double click rate
Like in the case of a sequential USD attack, also in this
attack double clicks can happen only when the previous
signal of a coherent state is a vacuum state or when the
previous signal of a vacuum state is a coherent state. The
probability to obtain a double click in each of these two
scenarios does not depend on the value of the phase θj of
the coherent state |βeiθj 〉 involved, but it depends only
on the mean photon-number µβ . This means that the
analysis included in Sec. IVB also applies here, and the
average total number of double clicks per block sent by
Eve in a sequential MED attack is also given by Eq. (13).
C. Evaluation
In Fig. 10 we plot the Gain versus the QBER in a
sequential MED attack for a fix value of the maximum
tolerable double click rate at Bob’s side (Dc < 10
−8) and
for different values of the parameter λ. Like in Sec. IVC,
we fix the value of Mmin as Mmin = ⌊M/2 + 1⌋, and
we perform a numerical optimization to find the optimal
mean photon number µβ for each given values of the pa-
rameters M , q, and λ. Moreover, in this example, we
consider that the mean photon number of Alice’s signal
states is given by µα = 0.16 and we also include the
experimental data obtained in Ref. [16].
A similar graphical representation is included in
Fig. 11, but now for the case where Alice and Bob do
not monitor separately the double click rate and Eve can
optimize the mean photon number µβ for each given val-
ues of M , Mmin = ⌊M/2 + 1⌋, q, and the parameter λ,
without any restriction on the maximum tolerable double
click rate at Bob’s side.
While in a sequential USD attack the maximum value
of the Gain is given by Eq. (14), in a sequential MED
−7 −6 −5 −4 −3
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
Log(G) 
λ = 
1 
b/a 
λ 
λ 
λ 
λ 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 λ = 6 
Q 
FIG. 10: Gain versus QBER in a sequential MED attack for a
fix value of the maximum tolerable double click rate at Bob’s
side (Dc < 10
−8), and for different values of the parameter
λ: λ1 = b/a (solid), λ2 = b/a + (1 − b/a)/5 (dashed), λ3 =
b/a+2(1− b/a)/5 (dotted), λ4 = b/a+3(1− b/a)/5 (dashed-
dotted), λ5 = b/a + 4(1 − b/a)/5 (thick solid), and λ6 = 1
(thick dashed). The mean photon number of Alice’s signal
states is µα = 0.16. The triangle represents experimental
data from Ref. [16].
attack Eve can always increase the value of the Gain
at the expense of also increasing the resulting QBER at
Bob’s side, just by incrementing the parameter λ. In
particular, in the limit case of λ = 1, i.e., the filtering
operation is just the identity operation, we have that p =
1 and pλ=1succ = 1. In this situation, the Gain, the QBER,
and the double clock rate at Bob’s side are, respectively,
given by G = 1 − exp(−µβ), Q = exp(−4µα)/2, and
Dc = 0. That is, by selecting a proper mean photon
number µβ Eve can always access any high value of the
Gain.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have quantitatively analyzed limita-
tions on the performance of differential-phase-shift (DPS)
quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols based on
weak coherent pulses. For that, we have investigated
simple eavesdropping strategies based on sequential at-
tacks: Eve measures out every coherent state emitted by
Alice and prepares new signal states, depending on the
results obtained, that are given to Bob. Whenever Eve
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FIG. 11: Gain versus QBER in a sequential MED attack for
the case where Alice and Bob do not monitor separately the
double click rate obtained by Bob, and for different values of
the parameter λ: λ1 = b/a (solid), λ2 = b/a + (1 − b/a)/5
(dashed), λ3 = b/a+ 2(1− b/a)/5 (dotted), λ4 = b/a+3(1−
b/a)/5 (dashed-dotted), λ5 = b/a+4(1− b/a)/5 (thick solid),
and λ6 = 1 (thick dashed). The mean photon number of
Alice’s signal states is µα = 0.16. The triangle represents
experimental data from Ref. [16].
obtains a predetermined number of consecutive success-
ful measurement outcomes, then she prepares a train of
new coherent pulses that is forwarded to Bob. Other-
wise, Eve sends vacuum signals to Bob to avoid errors.
Sequential attacks transform the original quantum chan-
nel between Alice and Bob into an entanglement breaking
channel and, therefore, they do not allow the distribution
of a secret key.
Specifically, we have considered two possible sequen-
tial attacks. In the first one, Eve realizes unambiguous
state discrimination (USD) of Alice’s signal states. When
Eve identifies unambiguously a signal state sent by Alice,
then she considers this result as successful. Otherwise,
she considers it a failure. In the second attack, Eve per-
forms first a filtering operation on each signal emitted
by Alice and, afterwards, she measures out each success-
ful filtered state following the approach of minimum error
discrimination, i.e., she guesses the identity of the filtered
state with the minimum probability of making an error.
As a result, we obtained upper bounds on the maximal
distance achievable by differential-phase-shift quantum
key distribution schemes as a function of the error rate
in the sifted key, the double click rate at Bob’s side, and
the mean photon-number of the signals sent by Alice.
It states that no key distillation protocol can provide a
secret key from the correlations established by the users.
Instead of using an USD measurement on each signal
state sent by Alice, like in the first eavesdropping strat-
egy that we considered, Eve could as well employ the
same detection device like Bob [15]. A successful result
is now associated with obtaining a click in Eve’s appara-
tus, while a failure corresponds to the absence of a click.
However, since Alice’s signal states are typically coherent
pulses with small average photon number, the probability
of obtaining a successful result in this scenario is always
smaller than the one of a sequential USD attack. There-
fore, a sequential USD attack can provide tighter upper
bounds on the performance of DPS QKD protocols than
those derived from a sequential attack where Eve uses
the same measurement apparatus like Bob.
While in the standard Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84)
QKD protocol with phase randomized weak coherent
state sources it generally suffices that the legitimate users
monitor the error rate and gain of the scheme to guaran-
tee unconditional security, our analysis suggest that, in
DPS QKD, it might be very useful for the legitimate users
to monitor also the double click rate or the correlations of
detection probabilities between adjacent time-slots. This
fact could substantially increase Alice and Bob’s ability
in defeating sequential attacks. Therefore, it might be
advantageous for a security proof of DPS QKD to include
also Alice and Bob’s knowledge of double click rates and
correlations of detection events. Such a security proof
would be rather different from existing security proofs of
the standard BB84 protocol which often involves random
permutation and random sampling arguments.
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Appendix A: Probability p
In this Appendix we obtain an expression for the prob-
ability p that the last signal in a given block is a coherent
state |βeiθj 〉.
Let pm be the probability of Eve sending to Bob m
consecutive coherent states within a block of length M
such that the last signal of the block is a coherent state.
This probability is given by
pm =


0 if m < Mmin
q(1 − psucc)pMminsucc if m =Mmin
(1− psucc)pmsucc if Mmin < m < M
pMsucc if m =M .
(A1)
For each given block of signals that Eve sends to Bob we
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have, therefore, that p can be written as
p =
M∑
m=Mmin
pm =
[
psucc + (1 − psucc)q
]
pMminsucc . (A2)
Similarly, 1 − p represents the probability that the last
signal in a block is a vacuum state.
Appendix B: NMerrors in a sequential minimum error
discrimination attack
In this Appendix we obtain an expression for the av-
erage total number of errors NMerrors per block of length
M sent by Eve in a sequential MED attack.
We shall distinguish the different cases included in
Fig. 3, i.e., as a function of the number m of coherent
states inside a block and their position in the block.
Let us begin with Case A in Fig. 3. According to
Sec. VA, whenever the last signal state of the previous
block is a coherent state then the average total number of
errors obtained by Bob is given by Mp˜err. Otherwise, it
is given by (M −1)p˜err+ t/2. If the first m ∈ (Mmin,M)
signal states of the block are coherent states (Case B in
Fig. 3) and the last state of the previous block is also a
coherent state, then the average total number of errors
obtained by Bob is given mp˜err + t/2. Otherwise, the
average total number of errors is (m−1)p˜err+t. Similarly,
if Eve sends to Bob a block containing firstM−m vacuum
states followed by m ∈ (Mmin,M) coherent states (Case
C in Fig. 3) and the last signal of the previous block is
a coherent state, then the average total number of errors
is given by (m− 1)p˜err + t. Otherwise, the average total
number of errors has the form (m−1)p˜err+ t/2. Eve can
also send to Bob a block of signals where, at least, the
first and the last signals of the block are vacuum states
(Case D in Fig. 3). Then, if the last state of the previous
block is a coherent state, the average total number of
errors obtained by Bob is given by (m − 1)p˜err + 3t/2.
Otherwise, the average total number of errors is (m −
1)p˜err + t.
The results for the cases E, F, and G, in Fig. 3 can
be obtained directly from the cases B, C, and D, respec-
tively. One only needs to multiply the a priori proba-
bilities to be in each of these last three scenarios by the
factor q.
Finally, whenever the block that Eve sends to Bob con-
tains only vacuum states (Case H in Fig. 3) and the last
signal of the previous block is a coherent state, then the
average total number of errors is given by t/2. Otherwise,
the average total number of clicks is zero.
After including all the a priori probabilities to be in
each of the different cases discussed above, we obtain that
the average total number of errors per block of length M
in a sequential MED attack is given by Eq. (25).
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